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1. Introduction 
Although in most models successful leadership is 
equated with winning and with holding onto office, 
longevity in power cannot be the only variable used in 
assessing leadership, especially in a country such as the 
UK where the Prime Minister is also a party leader and 
where, as a consequence, there exists a powerful dia-
lectical relationship between internal and external con-
sequences of individual leadership. Therefore, even 
though there is an impression of immediate success 
through the historic series of election victories, as-
sessments of Tony Blair’s leadership must also include 
the effects on the long-term electoral prospects of the 
party, the level of internal democracy, the ability of the 
party to keep evolving, as well as the attitudes and 
feelings of members. A complete evaluation of leader-
ship would need to consider the triangle of agency, fol-
lowers and environment as well as the outcomes re-
sulting from the relations between the three. However 
this article seeks to analyse the issue of political lead-
ership specifically in its interaction with party man-
agement, which, according to Buller and James’s state-
craft model (2012), constitutes one of the five criteria 
by which to assess leadership. The dimension of indi-
viduality and personality cannot be set aside, nor can 
the context in which the evolution took place. But the 
decision to take party management as a focal point re-
flects the fact that, under New Labour, this dimension 
took centre stage. 
The approach, based on the identification of a long-
term trend towards increasing organisational conver-
gence between public and private organisations (Avril 
& Zumello, 2013), combines analytical tools and con-
cepts borrowed from both the field of political science 
and that of organisational studies. Pioneer political 
comparatist Joseph LaPalombara urges political scien-
tists to pay more attention to the concept of “organisa-
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tional learning”, which at present draws most of its 
knowledge from studies of the firm, arguing that “peo-
ple who see similarities in organisations, in whatever 
sphere they may be found, are basically correct in their 
perceptions” (LaPalombara, 2003, p. 575). This trend is 
reflected in a growing body of literature on tox-
ic/bad/destructive leadership indicating that political 
scientists are beginning to appropriate tools and con-
cepts previously confined to the business sphere. Thus 
McAnulla’s (2011) analysis of Blair’s leadership draws 
the “toxic triangle” model of destructive leadership 
from management studies experts Padilla, Hogan and 
Kaiser (2007), while Tim Heppell (2011) borrows from 
business academic Lipman-Blumen (2004) to test the 
applicability of the concept of “toxicity” to the study of 
five controversial political leaders, including Tony Blair. 
This coincides with the recent rise of critical approaches 
to leadership which emphasize destructive leaders’ be-
haviour, underlining the destructive dimension of char-
ismatic leadership (Collinson, 2012; Kellerman, 2012). 
The main objective of this article is to make a con-
tribution to bringing these two fields together by look-
ing at the practice of management in the Labour Party. 
Indeed, the subfield of organisational learning, which 
focusses on improving actual decision-making process-
es with a view to successfully adapting to changing en-
vironments, is of particular relevance to the study of 
party management. A characteristic of this study, 
therefore, is to be firmly grounded in empirical evi-
dence1. The method adopted for this research is best 
understood as a form of grounded theory, where cate-
gories and concepts are drawn from the data. It is an 
approach which is empirically based but borrows a va-
riety of thinking tools and concepts to identify patterns 
so as to make implicit belief systems explicit. Applied to 
New Labour party management, this method of en-
quiry helps uncover the main elements of a sweeping—
                                                          
1 This study is based on the empirical study of the changes un-
dergone by the party and their manifestations at local, regional 
and national level, using ethnographic methods of data collec-
tion. As opposed to Lewis Minkin, whose seminal work on La-
bour party management (Minkin, 2014) has constituted a very 
useful source of information for this article, and who, as an ad-
viser, enjoyed access to the party hierarchy and sought to have 
an influence on the evolution of party structures, I confined 
myself to roles which, like him, allowed me to collect the view-
points and feelings of a wide range of actors, would give me 
access to behind the scene information not available to mere 
observers and would help me experience events as other party 
members did, but never with a view to exerting direct influ-
ence. More specifically, my focus was on the operational level. 
The different roles I assumed (observer, party member and 
campaigner, conference visitor or delegate, steward etc.) from 
the early 1990s to the mid-2000s allowed me to witness first-
hand the culture clash between traditional members and the 
intake of new members as well as the tensions between local 
parties and regional and national party staff arising from the 
organisational reforms. 
yet implicit—culture change designed to replace what-
ever was left of the traditional Labour conference del-
egate democracy with a new organisational culture 
sustained by a number of structural as well as behav-
ioural changes. Therefore the aim of this article is to 
show the distinctiveness of New Labour’s party man-
agement relative to previous forms, to reveal its mostly 
hidden mechanisms, and to highlight the short-term ef-
fects as well as the long-term consequences of the new 
managerial approach whose effects are still felt today. 
Seeking to understand how and why the New Labour 
party management generally seemed to negate its own 
objectives, this article opens with a definition of New 
Labour’s brand of party management, then analyses its 
(often) unintended effects and impact on the organisa-
tion, leading to a more general assessment of the rela-
tionship between party management and organisa-
tional learning, so as to draw lessons from the New 
Labour experiment on change management in political 
parties. 
2. Defining New Labour’s Brand of Leadership and 
Management 
Although party management has always existed and is 
consubstantial to any party, close analysis of the evolu-
tion of party organisation under New Labour shows 
that the development of a managerial system stands as 
one of Blair’s main achievements and makes him his-
torically different from previous Labour leaders (Min-
kin, 2014). It must be acknowledged from the outset 
that management in political parties is unavoidable and 
even useful. Like any other organisation, a party needs 
to coordinate its activities, to engineer organisational 
cohesion and generally to create an atmosphere of 
trust, so as to obtain the desired outcomes as defined 
by the leadership at a given point in time. If we take a 
historical perspective of the Labour party, we see that 
party management, even in its less palatable dimen-
sion of procedural fixing, has always been there, since 
tensions inevitably appear between the strategic and 
the operational levels, with party managers mediating 
between the two. What is meant by management here 
is not simply the administration of the party machine 
(even if this aspect also needs to be taken into ac-
count) but refers to “what the managers, past and pre-
sent, themselves often talked of as ‘management’: the 
attempt to control problem-causing activities, issues 
and developments in order to ensure that outcomes 
were produced which the managers considered to be 
in the party’s best interests” (Minkin, 2014, p. 1). In 
this perspective, management is a function conducted 
alongside other functions. What can be observed in the 
case of New Labour is that this dimension takes a new 
and distinctive turn, taking precedence over all other 
functions, in order to create cohesion and consensus 
within the party. The result is what Minkin describes as 
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a “permanent revolution”, or a “rolling coup”, a suc-
cession of waves designed to take full control of the 
organisation. There is a tendency among academic and 
journalistic assessments of New Labour to question the 
very “newness” of the project and to seek to highlight 
elements of continuity, either with previous Labour ex-
periences or with the Conservative administrations. I 
argue along with Minkin that, when it comes to man-
agement of the party, New Labour was fundamentally 
different and novel.  
The analysis of New Labour’s particular brand of 
management requires us to first explore the tension 
between management and leadership. There exists a 
well-established classic literature on the relationship 
between leadership and organisational structures. Max 
Weber (1922/2013) first pointed out the continuities of 
structure deriving from the bureaucratic form present 
within all large-scale organisations and Robert Michels 
(1915) highlighted, through his “Iron law of oligarchy”, 
the bureaucratization of political parties. Angelo Pane-
bianco (1988) then put forward the electoral-
professional party model characterized by the 
strengthening of the role of leadership through greater 
reliance on professionals and the use of new forms of 
communication techniques. More recently, Richard 
Katz and Peter Mair (1994) theorized the emergence of 
the highly centralized cartel party. On the other hand, 
the conventional wisdom in business theory about the 
respective roles of the leader and the manager, which 
states that the leader “does the right thing” and the 
manager “does things right”, although crude, is quite 
relevant to political parties and constitutes a conven-
ient starting point to an evaluation of New Labour’s 
party management. In this view, the manager adminis-
ters, has a short-range view and relies on control, while 
the leader innovates, has a long-range perspective and 
inspires trust. Even though leadership and manage-
ment are very distinct concepts, in practice there is a 
natural overlap between the two. In the case of New 
Labour, it appears that they did more than overlap and 
that Blair’s leadership was actually largely subsumed in 
management, a situation which Minkin defines as the 
“managerised” party (Minkin, 2014, p. 700). 
A key dimension of the reforms is that they were 
based on a diagnosis of the party’s weaknesses as re-
sulting from tensions between party and government 
which had plagued previous Labour governments (the 
experience of the Wilson governments, repeatedly de-
feated at conference, stood out in particular). The New 
Labour project aimed to address this problem and was 
designed to bring party and leadership into alignment. 
Following the ideological adaptation brought about by 
the Policy Review conducted under Neil Kinnock, 
which, through a market research approach, aimed to 
identify the wishes of the electorate and adjust party 
policy accordingly, the views of the leadership were 
considered to be aligned with those of the voters. This 
meant ensuring that the local parties, the unions as 
well as dissident MPs could not get any traction. One 
key aspect of Blair’s outlook—and one which clearly 
distinguishes him from previous reformist Labour lead-
ers such as Kinnock—was also his lack of affinity with 
the Labour Party. In fact he appears to have generally 
regarded the party as the enemy, or at the very least 
an encumbrance and a source of embarrassment, ra-
ther than an asset and a source of leadership strength 
(Buller & James, 2012, p. 548; Minkin, 2014). As a re-
sult, the whole New Labour management strategy 
rested on a negative evaluation of the party, of its pre-
vious leaders (of whom almost no mention was ever 
made) and of its organisational culture. Blair saw the 
party both as a vehicle for his political ambition and as 
an obstacle to be overcome. He recalls rather candidly 
in his autobiography that upon John Smith’s death he 
had seen his opportunity to take hold of the Labour 
Party “like I suppose someone in business spots the 
next great opportunity, or an artist suddenly appreci-
ates his own creative genius, or a coach or player 
knows that their moment for glory is about to come” 
(Blair, 2010, p. 59). At the same time he was telling his 
adviser Philip Gould “it’s time we gave the party some 
electric shock treatment” (Gould, 1998, p. 218). The 
view was that the party needed to be corrected, its 
ideological baggage discarded and its traditional prac-
tices abandoned. Blair and his allies therefore thought 
it best to import a management culture which was al-
ien to the party, resulting in a frontal and systematic 
attack on all the elements of the traditional Labour 
Party culture. 
If we now try to characterize the New Labour vari-
ant of party management, a number of key features 
can be identified.2 A first feature is an ethics of deliv-
ery, more specifically an ethics of delivering to the 
leader rather than to the party, which lead to the ex-
tensive use of procedural fixes. Procedural tinkering is 
a constitutive part of management, which is outcomes 
rather than process oriented, and is to be expected. 
But this was taken to a new level with New Labour. Not 
only were rules and procedures seen as nothing more 
than time-wasting devices and scorned as “processolo-
gy” (Minkin, 2014, p. 137), but there were used as 
“flexible instruments of power” (Minkin, 2014, p. 666) 
to deliver results regardless of the manner. A second 
major feature of New Labour’s party management was 
                                                          
2 The elements presented in this section are based on Lewis 
Minkin’s The Blair Supremacy (2014), private conversations 
with Minkin, as well as discussions during a workshop on Min-
kin’s book organised by the PSA Labour Movements Group at 
the University of Leeds in October 2014, with contributions 
from Eric Shaw, Mark Wickham-Jones, Tim Heppell, Matt 
Beech, Lewis Minkin and myself. Some of these contributions 
have been published as a symposium in the Political Studies 
Review (see Avril, 2016). 
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the increased politicization of national and regional 
party staff (which was part of the wider “professionali-
zation” of the party). Party officials became partisan 
“party organisers” delivering to the leader and making 
up a praetorian guard around Blair. These elements 
were then underpinned by a culture change which is 
probably the most distinctive feature of New Labour. 
The modernisers around Blair—and Blair himself—
developed a specific attitude and behaviour, linked to 
their self-perception as an elite, a vanguard, imbued 
with a moral superiority which justified all the fixing. 
The New Labour people were steeped in a culture of 
being “bold” and unstoppable and relished the idea 
that they could get away with anything.  
The elements of New Labour’s change management 
strategy were hidden and dressed up in an official dis-
course of democratization. The reforms were said to 
aim at establishing a direct relationship between the 
leadership and the members, at doing away with what 
was dismissed as archaic routines (formal meetings 
were systematically described as excruciatingly boring 
and not an activity in which any sane member of the 
public would want to engage) so as to create a “vi-
brant”, “healthy” party which would be attractive to 
new categories of members. In practice, this meant the 
removal of most decisions from the formal decision-
making arena of the annual conference, through the 
creation of policy forums where discussions were sup-
posed to bring about a more “consensual” approach. 
However, despite initial hopes (for a positive evalua-
tion of the reforms, see Russell, 2005) the democratic 
quality of the new processes of policy making is very 
doubtful as procedures were designed so as to ensure 
the right results would emerge and dissenting voices 
struggled to make themselves heard (Heffernan, 2007, 
p. 156). The move towards direct democracy led to the 
erosion of the elective power of activists and the idea 
of increased membership participation did not entail 
increased membership influence (Avril, 2013). General-
ly, the new democratic processes presented in the 
1998 Partnership in Power review document translated 
into mere consultation exercises with no real impact on 
policy formulation. Overall, New Labour’s style of man-
agement can be defined as a form of a top-down, 
command-and-control “over-management”, which 
translated into a pattern of self-reinforcing practices 
the effect of which was not only to produce counter-
productive outcomes but more seriously to lead to a 
situation where the organisation found itself caught in 
a spiral of ever tightening control. 
3. The Unintended Effects of New Labour’s Party 
Management  
We will now look at some of the ways the New Labour 
management reforms are seen to have failed to 
achieve their main goals and then assess the impact 
which some of the modernisers’ errors of judgement 
had on the party. The counter-intuitive effects of 
change management have already been pointed out in 
the literature (notably Panebianco, 1988, p. 241). What 
is distinctive in the case of New Labour is that this spe-
cific party management approach appears to have 
been intrinsically self-defeating. Thus reforms which 
were designed to increase control often resulted, when 
implemented, in loss of control. The best-known cases, 
well documented and extensively commented upon in 
the media, are the messy handling, in 2000, of both the 
Livingstone mayoral candidacy in London and that of 
Rhodri Morgan’s campaign to lead the Welsh Assem-
bly, where the Labour leadership’s efforts to manipu-
late the outcome generated outraged media com-
ments and spectacularly backfired, since in both cases 
the candidates which the party leadership manoeuvred 
against went on to win. But even if the New Labour 
managers’ “control freakery” and procedural fixing is a 
well-established fact, its extent and effects have been 
greatly underestimated. 
A first unintended outcome was a result of the par-
ty leadership’s belief that their views and those of the 
voters were the same (Avril, 2013; Minkin, 2014). The 
party (the trade unions and the Constituency Labour 
Parties) was seen as holding views which were harmful 
because they were thought to be at odds with how the 
voters felt. Those who held such views therefore need-
ed to be contained. This strategy was particularly visi-
ble at the party conference where the New Labour 
managers used all the tricks in the book to ensure that 
there would be no damaging platform defeats. As I was 
able to observe, to avoid any coordinated rebellion, the 
principle of mandate was actively discouraged and in-
experienced conference delegates were briefed by par-
ty staff to vote according to personal preferences, and 
not, as had been the practice, to reflect the majority 
views of their local party. This occasionally led to dele-
gates from the same constituency voting against each 
other. Prior to crucial votes being taken, constituency 
delegates were often coaxed and/or intimidated 
through one-to-one encounters with ministers, and 
then through high-ranking party officers staring at 
them from a few feet away during the vote. The Lead-
er’s speech was now introduced by lengthy and loud 
warm ups of rousing pop songs and videos to the glory 
of the leader, with party organisers leading the clap-
ping. But Minkin provides several little-known exam-
ples showing that the belief in an alignment between 
the leadership and the voters was incorrect since, in 
some cases, it was in fact the leadership which was at 
odds with public sentiment (Minkin, 2014, p. 599). 
With constituency delegates being sometimes per-
suaded to vote in ways which went counter to the 
wishes of the wider membership, the leadership in ef-
fect cut itself off from feedback from the floor.  
The sustained efforts to control the grassroots were 
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based on a misconception of local parties and mem-
bers, who were seen, in keeping with the old Duverger 
model, as dangerous radicals who would thwart the 
modernisers’ ambition to make the party more respon-
sive to the voters. However, the rare empirical studies 
that have investigated the supposed ideological gap 
between Labour members and Labour voters (Seyd & 
Whiteley, 2002) have shown it to be in fact a matter of 
degree rather than of a real divergence of opinions. 
The weakened organisational vitality (as seen through 
the decline in membership as well as in the low level of 
participation in internal elections) resulting from the 
disregard for the importance of local party activists was 
considered a risk worth taking. But the cost of alienat-
ing the party became apparent during the 2005 general 
election campaign when internal party discontent ex-
pressed itself mainly through diminished activism and 
with many local parties positioning their parliamentary 
candidates clearly in opposition to the New Labour 
line. Even more paradoxical for a party whose main ob-
jective was to win elections, one of the most immedi-
ate and most significant effects of the New Labour’s 
party management, which worked hand in hand with 
management of the media, was the toxification of the 
party’s image. As a string of events exposed the party 
leadership’s willingness to bend the rules (starting with 
the Ecclestone scandal, then with the attempts to stop 
Ken Livingstone, and culminating with the controversial 
handling of the Commons over the Iraq war), New La-
bour soon found itself mired in a narrative of manipu-
lation and deceit. As a result, from early on, public per-
ceptions of New Labour were that it had a toxic 
influence on British political life (Avril, 2016). 
Other arguments to support the view that the 
modernisers’ achievements fell short of their objec-
tives include the fact that many of the changes associ-
ated with New Labour (such as the renegotiation of the 
relationship with the trade unions, or the more voter-
oriented approach to policy-making) were initiated un-
der Neil Kinnock and John Smith, well before Blair took 
over the party in 1994. Let us not forget either that 
Blair had not managed to get overwhelming support in 
1994. In addition, Minkin’s study shows that, overall, 
Blair never managed to establish a complete “suprem-
acy” over the party and that he faced constant and of-
ten effective resistance from the PLP, the unions and 
the CLPs. In fact, according to Philip Cowley (2007), 
parliamentary rebellions were a direct result of Blair’s 
autocratic style of leadership. Finally, even though Blair 
is commonly referred to in the literature as a “domi-
nant” leader by virtue of his exceptional personal char-
acteristics, his formidable status and resources as 
Prime Minister, and the very favourable conditions in 
which he started his premiership—even accounting for 
the often paralyzing tension with his internal challeng-
er Gordon Brown—it is noticeable that he failed to 
make his position more secure and was eventually 
forced by a distrustful parliamentary party to step 
down at a time which was not of his own choosing. The 
gradual and inexorable depletion of Blair’s capital, as 
highlighted by Bennister and Worthy (in press), can be 
accounted for to a large extent by his dysfunctional 
leadership and management methods. Overall the New 
Labour example shows that a command and control 
approach, which is supposed to entrench the leader’s 
position, is likely to generate powerful counter-
movements. 
New Labour was therefore clearly not the success 
story it has been described as. Not only is election vic-
tory obviously not the only criterion of success, but 
even in electoral terms the party’s accomplishments 
need to be set against the fact that the New Labour 
governments presided over a period of rising concern 
about disaffected voters. The record level of abstention 
in the 2001 general election was such a shock that it 
prompted the setting up of the Audit of Political En-
gagement. In addition, Blair’s leadership cannot be as-
sessed in isolation from the project which was de-
signed to sustain him in power. Party management 
under Brown retained the same features. In fact, the 
Blair/Brown duopoly was a constitutive part of the pro-
ject and one of its main weaknesses. The new empha-
sis on consensus-building, on bringing party and gov-
ernment closer together, instead turned a pluralistic 
party into a highly factionalized one (Avril, 2016). In 
their unshakable belief that any public display of disa-
greement would be electorally damaging, the New La-
bour managers engaged in party management that was 
so heavy-handed that it eventually led to systemic fail-
ure. Awareness of these shortcomings was occasionally 
voiced by leading figures in the party, including key ad-
viser Philip Gould who in 2000 acknowledged in a 
leaked memo that the New Labour brand had become 
“badly contaminated”, notably by a perceived lack of 
integrity. “Almost every issue that has caused us diffi-
culty has been anticipated”—he tellingly wrote—“but 
we have been powerless to turn foreknowledge into ef-
fective preventative action.” (The Guardian, 2000). The 
puzzle, then, is to understand why the New Labour 
managers proved unable to change their ways. 
4. New Labour’s Anti-Learning Practices 
There is an assumption that internal cohesion, in other 
words the harmony between the various groups which 
make up the organisation, is the condition for its dura-
bility. The Labour Party had patently suffered in the 
past from its image as a torn party. Shaw refers to this 
as a “debilitating civil war” which “impressed upon the 
public mind the image of an incessantly brawling and 
congenitally divided party” (Shaw, 1994, p. 166). How-
ever, even if disagreements are undeniably costly in 
electoral terms, one can also consider that too much 
consensus and the blandness of a “sanitized” party are 
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also harmful (Seyd & Whiteley, 1992, p. 207) since this 
type of party simply ends up putting the voters off as 
they can no longer distinguish between all the different 
parties. It also discourages activists, who lose any in-
centive to get mobilised and to campaign. Moreover, 
internal divisions may even help keep the party 
healthy, preventing it from ossifying, and counterbal-
ancing the oligarchic tendencies identified by Michels. 
Internal contestation maintains the political organisa-
tion’s dynamism and ability to innovate. The quest for 
consensus in the shaping of the New Labour party may 
therefore have been severely misguided from an or-
ganisational learning perspective. 
Shaw expressed concern at the gradual centralisa-
tion of power in the New Labour Party, fearing “dwin-
dling organisational vitality and ideological exhaustion” 
(Shaw, 1994, p. 166) and he underlined the necessity 
for an organisation wishing to avoid sclerosis to allow 
for the development within itself of units capable of 
autonomous action whose effect will be to provide an 
arena within which new ideas can be generated (Shaw, 
2002). Instead, the New Labour approach reflected a 
strict implementation of the principle of collective re-
sponsibility (which Shaw compares, as Richard Cross-
man had done in his time, to Leninist democratic cen-
tralism), with minority opinions being ignored. This 
problem was clearly seen in the way the newly created 
policy forums functioned, where minority opinions of-
ten failed to even be recorded. Shaw concludes that “a 
malleable party is unlikely to be an energetic one”, as 
shown by the mounting apathy within Labour ranks 
(Shaw, 2002). In an interview I conducted in 1995, Vla-
dimir Derer, founder of the Campaign for Labour Party 
Democracy, expressed the view, echoed by many party 
members, that only political debate can keep activists, 
whom the leadership relies on to run the local parties 
and campaigns, interested. Participation in the political 
debate, which “wine and cheese evenings” could never 
replace, is an essential motivation for partisan en-
gagement. Internal divisions and the possibility of ex-
pressing one’s disapproval of the official line are a con-
dition for organisational vitality. Therefore, if the risk of 
implosion is very real—as illustrated by the cata-
strophic party split of 1981 and the current disastrous 
public display of tensions between Corbyn and most 
Labour MPs—devitalisation may be just as dangerous. 
Another danger is the loss of a critical mind. One of 
the most interesting revelations coming out of Minkin’s 
observation of New Labour’s party management is a 
mechanism which Minkin refers to as “wilful blindness” 
or “blinkered realism” (Minkin, 2014, p. 709), a well-
known phenomenon referred to in the field of organi-
sational studies as “skilled unawareness” (Argyris, 
2012). In this model, we find an in-group of people 
who overrate their ability to make the right decisions, 
who are in complete denial of any discrepancies, are 
not able to see the warning signs, and who tend to 
blame any failures on external factors. This behaviour 
results in a dysfunctional decision-making process rem-
iniscent of Irving Janis’s famous exposition of “group-
think” (Janis, 1972) which, he explains, is likely to result 
both in irrational decisions and dehumanizing actions 
directed against outgroups. Janis describes the symp-
toms indicative of groupthink: first, overestimation of 
the power and morality of the group (whereby exces-
sive optimism and the unquestioned belief in the mo-
rality of the group causes members to ignore the con-
sequences of their actions); second, closed-
mindedness (warnings which might challenge the 
group’s assumptions are ignored and dissenters are 
stereotyped as weak, evil, biased or stupid); third, 
pressure towards uniformity (leading to the self-
censorship of ideas which deviate from the consensus, 
with members under pressure to conform). 
The parallels with the behaviour and mind-set of 
New Labour managers are striking. Refusal to conform 
to the new orthodoxy exposed party members to accu-
sations of disloyalty and the risk of being silenced at 
any cost. Left-winger Liz Davies, who served for two 
years on the party’s National Executive Committee be-
fore resigning, illustrates in her book this pressure to 
conform and the harmfulness of such esprit de corps. 
She describes the nonsense pervading some of the NEC 
meetings where “cabinet members or Millbank staff 
would repeat the most implausible versions or expla-
nations of events (the Guardian was a Tory paper, the 
election result was a disaster for Livingstone, rules ex-
isted even though no one had written them down) and 
nearly everyone around the table would nod in agree-
ment” (Davies, 2001, p. 173). NEC members, concerned 
that they might lose other members’ approval, careful-
ly strove not to deviate from the consensus, opting to 
keep their doubts and worries to themselves for fear of 
being seen as disloyal, thus feeding the shared illusion 
of unanimity. This process, which executive manage-
ment expert Karl Albrecht calls “learned incapacity” 
(Albrecht, 2003, pp. 17-38), condemns the organisation 
to certain failure, for when group members have liter-
ally “learned not to learn” errors no longer appear as 
such and the systematic response to emerging prob-
lems is the reckless decision to press on in the wrong 
direction. 
The plebiscitary party model developed by Seyd 
and Whiteley stresses the same thwarted processes. 
This model, characterised by “a veneer of democracy 
disguising centralisation and control” (Seyd & White-
ley, 2002, p. 176), is a threat to the party’s chances of 
survival since this “empty” structure can no longer fulfil 
key traditional functions such as campaigning and re-
cruitment. “The key problem”—they argue—“is that 
unaccountable power tends to make leaders stupid, 
out of touch and unwilling to do the hard work of 
building a rational case for policy initiatives” (Seyd & 
Whiteley, 2002, p. 174). Although Minkin is critical of 
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the plebiscitary model as applied to the Labour party, 
showing that early attempts initiated by Blair at con-
ducting internal referendums (such as on the 1997 par-
ty manifesto) were considered internally as fiascos and 
were quickly abandoned (Minkin, 2014), both lines of 
analysis converge in stressing that orthodoxy and cen-
tralised control are a danger to the organisation which 
finds itself cut off from a vital source of innovation and 
more likely to make mistakes. Although it is obvious 
that an undisciplined party is almost guaranteed to lose 
elections, we can argue that the New Labour manag-
ers’ exclusive concern for internal cohesion was even 
more harmful in the long run. This echoes Heppell’s 
definition of toxic leaders as “those individuals whose 
leadership generates a serious and enduring negative, 
even poisonous, effect upon the individuals, families, 
organisations, communities and societies exposed to 
their methods” (Heppell, 2011, p. 243). In fact, “tox-
ic”—or “destructive”—leadership is not only harmful to 
the organisation, since it subverts its structures and is 
negatively correlated to members’ well-being and 
commitment (Schyns & Schilling, 2013), but also self-
destructive. The way the New Labour leadership stifled 
all dissenting opinion, imposing a new orthodoxy 
throughout the organisation, turned the party into an 
exemplar of Goleman’s classic “toxic organisation”, an 
organisation which closed itself to new ideas for fear of 
having to question its own assumptions and where 
people stopped asking “how and why things [were] 
done” (Goleman, 2002, p. 195). 
Some tenets of the field of innovation research, 
which emerged in the 1960s and rapidly expanded 
from the mid-1990s, also help shed light on some of 
New Labour’s organisational shortcomings. In the so-
called knowledge economy, innovation is universally 
regarded as vitally important to organisations of every 
nature. As the growing uncertainty of the working envi-
ronment of businesses finds an echo in politics, where 
the effects of globalisation and technological change 
are also felt, parties are seeking new ways to respond 
to the challenge of a clientele that is increasingly diffi-
cult to attract and to retain. Clayton Christensen (2000) 
explains in his landmark book on innovation how tradi-
tional big businesses, which developed systems aiming 
at eliminating everything that the clients did not want, 
found themselves in a position of no longer being able 
to respond to the customers’ expectations when these 
changed. Christensen thus identifies a “dilemma” 
which is that, in business, efficient management—
management focused on the short-term needs of cus-
tomers and on improving the product—often turns out 
to be the very cause of eventual failure. This is a warn-
ing which the New Labour managers would have been 
well advised to heed when they devised a whole com-
munication strategy aimed at “Middle England”, a spe-
cific and narrow segment of the market deemed to be 
key. In his classic work on the rules of innovation, 
James Utterback explains that once a new idea has 
been created, the future of the organisation will de-
pend on whatever will be done with that new idea. He 
goes on to highlight the paradox of leaders closing 
ranks around an innovative idea so as to protect it, and 
concentrating on the product which the process has 
led to rather than on the process itself. “It is a great 
irony”—he writes—“that wisdom for many firms that 
derive current good fortune from radical innovations of 
the past lies in erecting barriers to these same types of 
innovations today” (Utterback, 1996, p. 224). This hos-
tility to any further change which might threaten the 
new idea is clearly reflected in the Labour party mod-
ernisers’ main concern to defend the New Labour “pro-
ject”, to unite the various sections of the party around 
it, rather than to create the conditions for new ideas to 
continue to emerge. Indeed, a key manifestation of the 
New Labour party management is the way the modern-
isers were trapped in a self-protective outlook whereby 
the problems resulting from Blair’s leadership were 
never raised despite mounting evidence of poor deci-
sion-making. Blair himself simply could not question 
the assumptions on which his whole management of 
the party had been based and the New Labour manag-
ers around him generally found it difficult to accept that 
their approach may have produced adverse effects. Pe-
ter Mandelson, despite being one of Blair’s main cham-
pions, describes him as someone who, once he had an 
idea, became “firm and persistent” about it, was “con-
fident in his own overall judgement” and “expects the 
agreed plan to be carried out to the letter by those who 
work for him” (Mandelson & Liddle, 1996, p. 53). In sum, 
what the field of innovation research tell us is that in-
novation is not so much about discarding the “old” as it 
is about harnessing the collective wisdom of the organ-
isation’s members. 
A more appropriate organisational model, it is ar-
gued, is that of the “learning organisation”, as original-
ly defined by Peter Senge or Bob Garratt,3 where the 
learning potential of the organisation is considered as 
its only really long-lasting competitive advantage. This 
approach, also known as “action learning”, which was 
pioneered by Reg Revans in the UK and Chris Argyris in 
the US in the 1970s and 1980s, and later popularized 
by Peter Senge, calls for a re-evaluation of the tradi-
tional managerial practices based on an obsolete tay-
lorist and mechanistic conception of organisations. Ac-
tion learning, also known as “double loop” learning, is a 
process of detection and correction of errors which 
                                                          
3 We need to distinguish between two schools: on the one 
hand, “organisational learning”, as theorised by Chris Argyris 
(see for example Argyris, 2004) which looks at the learning 
mechanisms within organisations, and, on the other hand, “the 
learning organisation” whose proponents focus essentially on 
advocating the adoption of new ways of functioning, as in the 
case of Peter Senge (1990) and Bob Garratt (2001). 
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protects the organisation against modes of functioning 
that go against its long term interests. While single 
loop learning refers to corrections that do not question 
in-built theoretical assumptions, double loop learning 
challenges the mental models and allows for the gov-
erning norms and values to be adjusted (Argyris & 
Schön, 1978). Crucially here, action learning is based on 
the idea that the key to improving performance does 
not lie with the abstract theories put forward by man-
agement experts, but with the practitioners them-
selves who learn from their own actions and experi-
ence (Boshyk & Dilworth, 2010).  
To assert its “newness”, New Labour wanted a 
clean break from Labour’s past, but what was swept 
away in the process was also the “accumulated wisdom 
of past experience” (Minkin, 2014, p. 143). New La-
bour’s “anti-learning practices” (Minkin, 2014, p. 715) 
thus betrayed its inability to adopt the learning meth-
odology required for the creation of new ideas. The ef-
fect of this inability to learn from mistakes and the sys-
tematic corruption of the party’s internal democracy 
was to alienate both the members and the voters. In 
this sense, it is true to say that internal consensus and 
cohesion, as they manifested themselves in New La-
bour, constituted obstacles to innovation and there-
fore endangered the survival of the party. The antidote 
to this self-defeating management model lies with a 
leadership model which takes the well-being of mem-
bers into account and which can generate an atmos-
phere of trust, where the aims of the party are not fo-
cused so much on explicit linear goals and more on the 
expressive functions of membership. 
5. Conclusion 
This analysis of the practice of party management un-
der New Labour has shown the benefits of an approach 
drawing together the fields of political science and or-
ganisational studies to study the evolution of Labour 
Party power structures and processes under the lead-
ership of Tony Blair. This approach is further bolstered 
by the fact that New Labour explicitly sought to emu-
late the private sector, with Blair trumpeting his admi-
ration for management thinkers such as Charles Handy 
and Charles Leadbeater (who became his adviser). It is 
ironic that as Tony Blair became leader and as New La-
bour was swept into power, an entire wave of ground-
breaking management books, developing the model of 
the learning organisation (Senge, 1990), offering new 
thinking on innovation—the books by Utterback (1996) 
and Christensen (2000) first came out in 1994 and 1997 
respectively—and underlining the crucial importance 
of emotional intelligence in leadership (Goleman, 1998, 
2002), came out in close succession, repudiating the 
managerial tenets which had dominated the 1980s and 
1990s. Despite Blair supposedly seeking advice from 
high profile management thinkers, none of this new 
thinking seems to have filtered into New Labour’s party 
management. At the time when New Labour was prac-
ticing self-censorship, in the business world emphasis 
was being placed on the production of new ideas as 
the best way of developing competitive advantage. En-
gaging fully with employees in strategy and delivery 
was now shown to be the key to achieving the organi-
sation’s objectives. The New Labour reforms, which 
aimed at increasing efficiency essentially through the 
suppression of any dissenting voice, were therefore out 
of step with this new thinking. In addition, Blair’s mod-
el of the CEO being able to make decisions on the hoof 
without the encumbrance of procedures was anything 
but based on the practical realities of management in 
corporations. New Labour thus drew inspiration from 
thinking that was divorced from practice, on precepts 
which were being questioned within the private sector, 
and on a distorted vision of corporate life.  
The rise and demise of the New Labour brand 
demonstrates that lack of respect for due process, em-
phasis on short-term success, and rule bending all have 
a short-term as well as long-term cost. The manage-
ment processes, the rules and procedures an organisa-
tion follows, are more than mere technicalities. They 
affect the party’s image and reputation in ways which 
reverberate beyond the boundaries of the organisation 
and which have an impact on the way the party engag-
es with the voters. Rule twisting results in a loss of 
trust internally and externally, reinforcing voters’ nega-
tive appraisals of political elites. The fact that Tony 
Blair is now widely disliked, perceived as he is as a “ce-
lebrity’” bent on raking the money in, gives an indica-
tion of this cost. But the damage goes much further 
since the whole organisation became tainted. The La-
bour Party was left discredited and disconnected, with 
weakened ties to its “natural” constituency. Therefore 
what this article has shown is how this kind of “domi-
nant” leadership, which can be said to be strong in a 
command and control sense, achieves results that fall 
considerably short of what was sought (Bennister & 
Worthy, in press; Brown, 2014) and is even largely 
counterproductive.  
The post-Blair Labour Party, where lack of charisma 
in leaders has become a virtue, bears the hallmarks of 
this legacy, in a way which recalls the predicaments of 
the post-Thatcher Conservative Party. Indeed, the tox-
ic/heroic ambivalence outlined by Lipman-Bluman 
(2004) is particularly relevant to the analysis of the poi-
sonous legacy of charismatic leaders such as Blair. An 
organisational culture which erects the loyalty and 
compliance of team members as its cardinal values, 
and where leaders are encouraged to believe in their 
own narrative that all is well despite evidence to the 
contrary (Collinson, 2012), fatally curtails a party’s abil-
ity to learn and to evolve. Contrary to Minkin’s hopeful 
statement that, with the end of New Labour, the dam-
age has largely been undone, descriptions of Ed 
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Miliband’s excessive reliance on a very small circle of 
trusted allies and of his tendency to interpret any criti-
cism as a sign of disloyalty (Wintour, 2015) seem to 
confirm that the organisational reflexes acquired in the 
New Labour years are very difficult to shake off (Hef-
fernan, 2007). This analysis of the legacy of Blair’s 
brand of party management has therefore underlined 
the long-term impact of this organisational transfor-
mation on the way the Labour Party has since contin-
ued to (dys)function as an organisation, with wider 
consequences for British politics. The line of inquiry 
presented in this article thus opens many avenues for 
further research on the leadership and management of 
political organisations. 
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